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Equal treatment of shareholders
and European Union law
Case note on the Decision “Audiolux” of the European Court of Justice
by
Federico M. Mucciarelli*
The European Court of Justice has recently issued a decision on the existence of
a general principle of equal treatment of minority shareholders upon a transfer
of control. According to the plaintiff, from certain specific acts of EU law (such
as, among others, the mandatory bid rule provided for by the Takeover
Directive) could be inferred the existence of a principle, according to which the
person who purchases the control of a company should then offer to all other
shareholders the same opportunity to sell their shares. The ECJ denied that
such a principle can be inferred from specific provisions of derivative EU law
beyond their scope of application. In addition, the ECJ has put in clear words
that, in order to impose to the acquirer of corporate control a duty to purchase
all outstanding shares, a specific legislative decision is required, with the aim to
weight all involved interests.
Table of Contents ECFR 2010, 158 – 167
I. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
II. The facts and the questions referred to the court . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
III. The decision of the ECJ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
IV. Equal treatment of shareholders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162
1. Equal treatment of shareholders vis-à-vis the corporation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162
2. Equal treatment of shareholders upon a change of control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
V. General principles of EU law and the competences of EU bodies vis-à-vis member
states. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165
* Associate Professor of business law and fellow of CEFIN, Faculty of economics,
University of Modena and Reggio Emilia – federicomaria.mucciarelli@unimore.it.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
I. Introduction
The issue tackled by the ECJ ruling in the case Audiolux is whether EU law
provides for a general principle of equal treatment of minority shareholders
upon a change of control. According to the plaintiff, such principle applies
independently from the existence of a “positive” rule and, in particular,
beyond the scope of application of the mandatory bid rule, provided for by the
Directive 2004/25/CE on takeover bids (hereinafter, the “Takeover Direc-
tive”).
Behind this specific question, which is rooted in company law and securities
regulation, the ECJ faced the issue of the relations between EU law and
domestic law of member states, which is a general question of the “constitu-
tional architecture” of the EU legal system. Indeed, had the ECJ inferred the
existence of such a general principle, the EU would have pre-empted the law-
making powers of member states beyond the wording of specific EU
derivative acts.
II. The facts and the questions referred to the court
The controversy was raised by the transfer of the control stake of RTL, a
Luxemburgish public company listed on regulated markets of Luxembourg,
London and Frankfurt.
Before the transaction, RTL had two major shareholders and several minority
shareholders. The majority shareholders were GBL, which held 30 % of RTL
shares, and Bertelsmann Westdeutsche TV GmbH, which held 37 % of RTL
share capital. The latter was controlled by Bertelsmann GmbH, which held
80 % of its shares. In 2001 GBL exchanged its shareholding in RTL with 25 %
of Bertelsmann GmbH’s shares. Therefore, after the transaction, Bertelsmann
held directly 30 % and indirectly, through Bertelsmann Westdeutsche TV
GmbH, 37 % of RTL share capital; to sum up, Bertelsmann GmbH in
practice controlled, directly or indirectly, 67 % of RTL share capital, while
GBL had a significant share of Bertelsmann GmbH capital. After this
transaction, RTL delisted from the London Stock Exchange.
Audiolux and other minority shareholders brought a proceeding in front of
the Luxembourg’s district court for annulment of the agreement between
GBL and Bertelsman or, as alternative, to hear them jointly liable to pay
compensation to the minority shareholders that did not have the opportunity
to share the control price with the new majority shareholder. The claimants
argued that a general principle of equal treatment of shareholders upon a
change of control should be inferred from a number of rules of derivative EU
law. In particular, the claimants mentioned following acts as basis of such a
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principle: (a) articles 20 and 42 of the Second company law directive,
according to which corporations should respect equal treatment of their
shareholders; (b) Recommendation of the Commission of 35. 7.1977 con-
cerning a code of conduct on transactions in transferable securities; (c)
Directive 79/279/CE on the admission to securities market, that claim for a
general duty of equal treatment of investors; (d) Takeover Directive, whose
article 5 provides for the mandatory bid rule, as a mean to protect minority
shareholders upon a transfer of corporate control. Pursuant to claimants’
arguments, behind all these acts lies a general principle of equal treatment of all
shareholders, which does not distinguish among transactions vis-à-vis the
company (such as purchase of own shares) and transactions between
shareholders (purchase of corporate control from another shareholder).
In practice, the real reason why Audiolux adopted this argument is very
simple. The transaction of RTL control occurred in 2001 and at that time
Luxembourg securities regulation did not provide for a mandatory bid rule
and the Takeover Directive was not yet in force. In addition, the mandatory
bid rules provided for by the Londoner City Code on Takeover and Merger
and by French law, where RTL shares were also listed, does not apply to
foreign corporations1. As result, the Audiolux and its barristers, in order to
obtain a portion of the control premium, had only one way in front of them: to
argue that the mandatory bid rule, which was explicitly provided for only in
2004 by the Takeover Directive, proves the existence of a general principle of
EU law that existed even before the enactment of the directive.
The District Court and the Court of Appeal of Luxembourg rejected the claim
of Audiolux, stating that no general principle of equal treatment of share-
holders upon the change of corporate control exists under EU law, but only
certain equality rules provided for by specific directives. The ruling of the
Court of Appeal was then brought in front of the Court de Cassation of
Luxemburg, which suspended its judgement and referred some questions to
the ECJ for a preliminary ruling. The questions referred to the ECJ can be
summarized as follows: (1) whether the specific derivative acts mentioned
above are manifestations of a general principle of EU law of equal treatment of
shareholders; (2) whether this principle (if ever existing) applies only in the
relation between companies and their shareholders or also between minority
and majority shareholders upon a change of control; (3) if questions 1 and 2 are
answered in the positive, whether such a principle should be considered as
existent even before the approval of the Takeover Directive.
1 Rule 9 City Code on takeover and Mergers and article L433– 3 Code Monetaire et
financier. See: Ryngaert, “Cross-Border takeover regulation: a transatlantic perspec-
tive”, in ECFR (2007) 441.
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III. The decision of the ECJ
The ECJ answered all three questions in the negative, using the arguments
summarized hereunder.
First, the Court denied that a general principle of equality upon a transfer of
control can be inferred from non-binding acts such as a Recommendation of
the Commission2. As a consequence, the Court focussed its attention upon the
Directive 77/91 on increase and reduction of the legal capital, the Directive 79/
279, on the transparency requirement, and the Takeover Directive.
The Directive 77/91 on capital requirement is the second directive aimed at
harmonizing company laws of member states (hereinafter, the “Second
Directive”). Its article 42 states that “the laws of the Member States shall
ensure equal treatment to all shareholders who are in the same position”.
However, the ECJ points out that from this article it is not possible to argue
the existence of a general principle of equal treatment, as the scope of
application of the former is limited to “the purposes of the implementation of
this Directive”, that is to say to increases and reductions of legal capital and to
own shares’ repurchases3.
The Court rejected also the argument based on the Directive 79/279 (which
was on the conditions for the admission of securities to official stock
exchanges). Pursuant to Point 2(A) of Schedule C of this Directive, listed
companies “shall ensure equal treatment for all shareholders who are in the
same position”. This Directive was then replaced by the Directive 2001/34 on
listing and transparency requirements, whose article 65 provided for an
identical principle of equal treatment of shareholders by the issuer company.
However, the Directive 2004/109/CE eliminated this article and provided for
a more restricted principle of equality regarding the information4. As a result,
also from these rules can not be inferred the existence of a general principle of
EU law.
Finally, the ECJ turns its attention to the mandatory bid rule provided for by
the Takeover Directive, according to which if a person acquires the control of
a listed company, he or she should then launch a tender offer for all
outstanding shares at the same price paid to purchase the control. The question
arises as to whether the mandatory bid rule is expression of a general principle
of EU law, which pre-exists to the enactment of the Takeover Directive and,
hence, applies beyond the its scope of application. The ECJ Rejected this
2 Audiolux, par. 34
3 Audiolux, par. 37.
4 Article 17 Directive 2004/109/CE. See Audiolux, par. 41: it is worth to mention that the
ECJ mistakenly attributed article 17 to the Directive 2001/34 not to the latest Directive
2004/109. See Advocat General Opinion, par. 12.
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interpretation, holding that the mandatory bid rule provided for by the
Takeover Directive is a specific provisions, which applies only to well-defined
situations within the scope of application established by the Directive itself5.
The ECJ concludes its reasoning with some general remark on the scope of
application of EU powers. The ECJ points out that, even assuming that a
general principle of “equal treatment” exists under EU law, one needs to
establish the legal means aimed at enforcing such principle and to protect
minority shareholders. This goal needs a specific rule aimed at balancing
different interests. As a consequence, the principle of equality claimed by
Audiolux can not be a “general principle of EU law”, but is simply a rule that
should be enacted through a specific political choice, either at EU or Member
states’ level6, that weights the different interests involved in the transaction
(e. g. minority shareholders v. new control shareholder)7.
IV. Equal treatment of shareholders
The decision of the ECJ to reject Audiolux’s claims deserves to be praised.
Indeed, the plaintiff blurs the distinction between equal treatment vis-à-vis
the corporation and equality upon a change of control. The former is a duty
burdened to the company, which applies to decisions that affects share-
holders’ interests, while the latter is a duty of the majority shareholder to share
the control premium with all minority shareholders. A brief description of
these two kinds of “equality” will clarify this issue.
1. Equal treatment of shareholders vis-à-vis the corporation
The equal treatment of shareholders vis-à-vis the corporation is a duty
imposed to company’s bodies. However, the language “equal treatment” or
“equality” is only apparently clear and under such a wording one can mean
different legal rules. Indeed, we should distinguish two different “equalities”:
on the one hand, the general criterion of equality regarding rights and duties
attributed to shareholders by the articles of association and by the law8 and, on
the other hand, equal treatment of shareholders vis-à-vis companies’ decisions
on the basis of the general criterion of equality9.
5 Audiolux, par. 50.
6 Audiolux, par. 61.
7 Audiolux, par. 62.
8 In the German wording: Gleichberechtigung.
9 Gleichbehandlung.
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The former is the basic distributive principle upon which the relations among
shareholders are built, which answers the basic question “Equality of
what?”10. Shareholders might have many things in common, but not all of
these are relevant for company law and for the rule of equal treatment, so it is
necessary to establish whether different shareholders are in the same situation
or not. Usually, the distributive criterion adopted by company law is the share
of legal capital held by shareholders, but the competent jurisdiction could
provide for different criteria or allow the article of association to distinguish
among different classes of shares.
By contrast, the equal treatment of shareholders vis-à-vis the company is a
limit to the powers of company’s bodies, so its infringement might lead to
annulment of a corporate decision or to sue the directors for damages11. Being
this a duty burdened to behaviours and decisions of company’s bodies, the
competent jurisdiction can admit exceptions under specific circumstances12.
In addition, in all jurisdictions the question arises as to whether company’s
decisions that treat shareholders formally equal, but in reality affect them
differently due to personal positions or interests of such shareholders, are
encompassed by equality vis-à-vis the company or by other principles or
fiduciary duties, such as the “abuse” of majority powers or the “fraud” on the
minority. To sum up, each jurisdiction is free to shape autonomously the
contours of this principle. In addition, there is no shared view among legal
scholars and among member states regarding the content of the principle of
equal treatment13.
2. Equal treatment of shareholders upon a change of control
Differently from equal treatment of shareholders vis-à-vis the company, the
“mandatory bid rule” provided for by the Takeover Directive aims at attaining
equal treatment of shareholders upon a change of control and vis-à-vis the
majority shareholders.
According to the mandatory bid rule, any change of control triggers the duty
to launch a tender offer for all outstanding shares. The rationale behind this
10 See: Sen, Equality of what? Tanner Lecture on Human Values, Stanford 1979.
11 See: Verse, Der Gleichbehandlungsgrundsatz im Recht der Kaptalgesellschaften, Mohr
Siebeck, Tübingen (2006) 8 et seq.
12 For example, see German case law: BGH “Minimax II”, BGHZ 33, 1960, 175 ss.,
according to which the exclusion of pre-emptive rights of certain shareholders is
justified to defeat the bid of a competing firm that, after the purchase of control, would
have liquidated the company (“eine ungleiche Behandlung der Aktionäre […] zulässig
[ist], wenn sie sachlich berechtigt ist und damit nicht den Charakter der Willkür trägt”,
p. 186).
13 See Advocat General Opinion, par. 89.
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rule is debated14: one important reason is to mitigate the pressure to tender on
target’s shareholders15, but also equal treatment of minority shareholders can
be one of its goals. Indeed, if the bidder purchases the target’s control through
a private transaction, the mandatory bid rule allows minority shareholders,
who have been previously neglected, to sell their shares and to gain a portion
of the control premium. In other words, if a mandatory bid rule is in place, all
shareholders are treated equally regarding the opportunity to share the
control premium. This is particularly true in the EU, as pursuant to the
Takeover Directive the new control shareholder should offer the highest price
paid for target’s shares during a period of 6 to 12 months prior to the bid,
unless the competent authority allows an exception in specific circumstances
to be established on a case by case basis according to domestic law16.
However, according to Audiolux the mandatory bid rule is not simply a
specific rule provided for by the Takeover Directive, but is the manifestation
of a general principle, which applies also to non listed companies and beyond
the scope of application of the Takeover Directive.
This theory is not completely new. In Germany, for instance, before a
mandatory bid rule was in place17, some scholars18 argued that, after having
purchased the control of a company, the new majority shareholder owes to
their fellow-shareholders a duty to share with them a portion of the control
premium. According to these theories, such duty should be inferred from
general fiduciary duties that shareholders owe one another19, which should be
extended to market decisions that might affect the interests of other
shareholders. However, this ingenious20 theory can not be accepted, as
minority shareholders are not in the same position as control shareholder and,
14 Enriques, “The mandatory bid rule in the Takeover Directive: harmonization without
foundation?”, ECFR (2004) 440.
15 This is the case also for s.c. “two-tier” bids, where the bidder launches a second bid for
outstanding shares at a price lower than that offered in the first partial bid.
16 Article 5(4) Takeover Directive.
17 The German Takeover Act (WpÜG) entered into force in 2002.
18 Reul, Die Pflicht zur Gleichbehandlung der Aktionäre bei privaten Kontrolltransak-
tionen, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen (1991) 161 et seq. and page 306; Weber, Die
Vormitgliedschaftliche Treubindung, Beck, München, 379 et seq. (fiduciary duties exist
even before the purchase of control).
19 See: BGH “ITT”, BGHZ 65, 15 (fiduciary duties among shareholders of private limited
companies – GmbH) and BGH “Linotype”, BGHZ 103, 185 (fiduciary duties in closely
held public companies). Cf. Hirte, Kapitalgesellschaftsrecht6, RWS, Köln, 2009,
par. 3.292.
20 This theory picks a relevant aspects of the mandatory bid rule, which is basically a
fiduciary duty of the majority shareholder vis-à-vis other shareholders in a specific
circumstance: Ebenroth / Wilken, “Kollisionsrechtliche Einordnung transnationaler
Unternehmensübernahmen”, 90 Zeitschrift für Vergleichende Rechtswissenschaft (1991)
242.
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hence, control premium does not “belong” to them and they should not have
the right to share it21.
In addition, we should bear in mind that the mandatory bid rule reveals a
significant drawbacks as it reduces the overall amount of control transactions
and the disciplinary power of the market for corporate control upon directors’
behaviours22. The law-maker can obviously introduce such rule, but this
choice requires an explicit political decision that weights the interests of
minority shareholders against the interest of potential acquirers and of the
market.
V. General principles of EU law and the competences of EU bodies vis-à-vis
member states.
But the most important criticism against Audiolux’ arguments is related to the
concept of “general principle of EU law” and to the limit of the competence of
the EU vis-à-vis member states.
General principles of EU law are “constitutional” principles23 that define the
limits to the competences and powers of the EU bodies. Such principles are
commonly acknowledged as the principle of loyal-cooperation, of subsidi-
arity, of proportionality and legal certainty, of non discrimination24 and the
human rights of individuals vis-à-vis public authorities25. By contrast, a
principle of equality upon a control transaction is a rule that regulate private
transactions and such rule needs to be explicitly enacted by a law-making
body that has jurisdiction on this field. This point will be made clearer by
referring to the main arguments used by Audiolux.
The first argument was based upon the equal treatment of shareholders vis-à-
vis the company provided for by article 42 of the Second Directive on
company law. I have already shown that from this principle it is not possible to
infer an equal treatment of shareholders upon a change of corporate control,
even under domestic company law. In addition, it is relevant to point out that
this rule applies only within the scope of application of the directive itself, i. e.
to capital’ increases and reductions and to shares’ repurchases. Secondly,
21 See: Stella Richter Jr, Trasferimento del controllo e rapporti tra soci, Giuffrè, Milano
(1996) 245 et seq. ; Verse, Der Gleichbehandlungsgrundsatz im Recht der Kaptalgesell-
schaften (nt. 11) 183; D’attorre, Il principio d’eguaglianza tra soci nelle società per
azioni, Giuffrè, Milano (2007) 371.
22 Bebchuk “Efficient and Inefficient Sales of Control” 109 Quart. J. Econ (1994) 957
23 See: Pernice, “The Treaty of Lisbon: multilevel constitutionalism in action”, in 15 Col.
J. Eur. Law (2009) 369 et. seq.
24 See: Wyatt & Dashwood’s European Union law5, Thomson, London (2006) 235 et seq.
25 See: Advocat General Opinion, par. 67 et seq.
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Audiolux inferred the principle of equality upon a transfer of control from the
mandatory bid rule of the Takeover Directive. However, the Takeover
Directive was enacted only in 2004 and before its approval a mandatory bid
rule was not commonly accepted by all member states26. We should conclude
that EU law, at the moment of the transaction of RTL control, did not
explicitly pre-empted member states regarding the issue of whether a rule of
equal treatment of shareholders upon a transfer of control should be in place.
Consequently, the question arises whether the existence of an unwritten
principle can be inferred beyond the explicit scope of application of certain
EU acts. The answer should be in the negative, as the admission of such
unwritten principle would infringe the “constitutional” order of EU law and,
in particular, the separation of powers between EU bodies and member states.
We should bear in mind that the European Union enjoys only those
competences attributed by the Treaty. In the ECJ’s words: “the Community
constitutes a new legal order of international law for the benefit of which the
states have limited their sovereign rights, albeit within limited fields, and the
subjects of which comprise not only Member States but also their nationals.”27
Regarding company law issues, the EU competences are not exclusive but are
shared with member states. This means that if the EU has not yet exercised its
power to harmonize company law, no obligation arises for member states,
which are consequently free to regulate the subject matter. In addition, even if
the EU exercises its competence, member states are not completely pre-
empted and usually can regulate each issue within the frameworks of EU rules.
Let’s turn our attention again to the Second Directive and to the Takeover
Directive. Article 42 of the Second Directive does not fully harmonize the
issue of equal treatment vis-à-vis the company, as it does not put in clear
words the contours of this “equality”. As a consequence, member states are
free to shape this rule and its limits in the way they prefer, even within the
scope of application of the directive (capital increases or reductions an stock
repurchases)28. By contrast, the mandatory bid rule of the Takeover Directive
has a more stringent content, as it burdens the new control shareholder with a
specific duty to launch a tender offer at a certain price. However, precisely the
26 In particular, Luxembourg and the Netherland did not provide for the mandatory bid
rule before implementing the Takeover Directive. See: Wymeersch, “Übernahmean-
gebote und Pflichtangebote”, in ZGR (2002) 520 ss.
27 See: Case 26/62, Van Gend & Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen, 1963
E.C.R. 1 et seq.
28 For instance, English company law does not provide for a clear rule of equal treatment
of shareholders vis-à-vis the company, but reaches similar results through other rules
(the most relevant is the “unfair prejudice” of Section 994(1) Companies Act 2006):
Davies, Gower and Davies’ Principles of modern company law8, Thomson, London
(2008) 681 et seq.
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fact that this rule has clear contours gives evidence that member states were
pre-empted only within the scope of application of the Takeover Directive
and no unwritten rule can be inferred from it.
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